


Africa Report

April, 1961



In This Issue:

Roy Lewis:
Sierra Leone Independence

Carl Rosberg:
Report from Kenya

Manfred Halpern:
Egypt Discovers Africa

Sierra Leone's Prime Minister Sir Milton Margai with British Colonial Secretary Iain Macleod

Barclay's Photo Press, Ltd.

The Congo's Ninth Month of Independence

(A chronology of developments in March)

Feb. 28: Secretary General Hammarskjöld anticipates "quick response" to his appeal to African countries for additional troops to increase the UN force from approximately 16,653 to 23,000 men . . . A UN spokesman announces that five Communist newspapermen have been expelled from Stanleyville by Antoine Gizenga.

Mar. 2: Troops loyal to President Kasavubu's central Congo government kill 44 civilians in bitter street fighting in Luluabourg in reprisal for the death of three of their comrades at the hands of pro-Lumumba forces.

Mar. 3: India offers a brigade of 3,000 men to the UN forces in the Congo. With reinforcements offered by Liberia and Tunisia, this offer brings the total promised to about 4,000.

Mar. 4: Congolese soldiers loyal to President Kasavubu's central government seize control of the port of Banana from UN troops.

Mar. 5: The UN loses control of the port of Matadi, the vital entrepot for most of the Congo's imports and incoming personnel, when the 120-man Sudanese contingent guarding the port is attacked by a major force of central Congo government soldiers.

Mar. 7: President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, addressing the reopening of the Fifteenth General Assembly of the UN, calls for: (1) a primarily African command and troops in the Congo, (2) disarming of the Congolese army and retraining under UN supervision, (3) temporary withdrawal of all foreign diplomatic missions, (4) reconvening of the Congolese Parliament, (5) expulsion of all non-African personnel from the various Congolese armies, and (6) measures to "bring to justice" those responsible for the murder of Patrice Lumumba.

Mar. 8: Convening at Tananarive, capital of the Malgache Republic, for a roundtable conference, President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Ileo of Leopoldville, President Tshombe of Katanga, President Kalonji of the South Kasai "mining state," and President Kamitatu of the Leopoldville provincial government are not joined by Antoine Gizenga, head of the Stanleyville regime. In their opening session, they demand that the UN keep hands off the Congo and allow Congolese to settle the crisis by internal negotiation . . . The UN is rebuffed in its effort to negotiate the return of its forces to the port of Matadi.

Mar. 9: Congolese sources report agreement with UN authorities on a form of joint control over UN air traffic.

Mar. 10: Mr. Hammarskjöld announces that he is sending a representative to Brussels to demand a

speedup in the withdrawal of Belgian military personnel from the Congo . . . Mekki Abbas of Sudan arrives in Leopoldville to substitute temporarily for UN Special Representative Rajeshwar Dayal.

Mar. 11: Congolese political leaders at the Tananarive Conference agree to reorganize the Congo into a loose confederation of eight independent states based roughly on tribal cleavages. The conferees also agree to ask the UN to annul as "no longer necessary" the February 21 Security Council resolution permitting the use of force in the Congo, but "reaffirm the confederation's wish to collaborate with the UN provided this involves no violation of the confederation's sovereignty." They warn President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana to end his "unwarranted interference" in Congolese affairs and his "assumption of the right to speak for all Africa."

Mar. 15: The Soviet Representative to the UN calls for a General Assembly debate on the proposed confederation of independent Congolese states, charging that it is a Belgian trick to break up the Congo . . . Jason Sendwe, Baluba leader of the North Katanga breakaway state of Lualaba, offers to join the proposed confederation.

Mar. 16: Congolese troops loyal to Major General Mobutu close Coquilhatville airport in Equator Province to UN planes and threaten to shoot down any that try to land . . . In an interview with the Soviet news agency TASS, Antoine Gizenga rejects plan for a confederation of independent states and reasserts his claim, as vice-premier of the central government headed by the late Patrice Lumumba, to leadership of a united Congo.

Mar. 19: Hammarskjöld extends the term of office of UN Special Representative to the Congo Dayal, despite demands for his dismissal by President Kasavubu.

Mar. 20: President Joseph Kasavubu, in a press interview, asserts: "Since the United Nations came, conditions have grown worse. It was called to bring peace; it in fact brought disorder." . . . Major General Mobutu objects to plans to reorganize his army, observing that his only problem is finding money to pay his men.

Mar. 21: Premier Joseph Ileo appeals to the UN to recognize that the situation in the Congo has changed and that the Congolese are now able to solve their own problems. He predicts early negotiations with the Gizenga regime leading to a government of national unity and bitterly attacks Mr. Hammarskjöld's decision to send Mr. Dayal back to the Congo as head of the UN mission . . . The

UN's 11-nation Asian-African Conciliation Commission, chaired by Nigeria's Jaja Wachuku, submits its report to the General Assembly. The Commission's proposal for bringing peace to the Congo, which only Morocco and Ghana failed to sign, calls for (1) arrangement of a truce among differing factions leading to the creation of a provisional government of national unity; (2) restoration of law and order with UN assistance; (3) reorganization of the army outside of politics with UN cooperation; and (5) convening of parliament to establish a legal government and to provide the country with a permanent constitutional structure . . . Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, opening a new General Assembly discussion of the Congo, bitterly attacks the UN role in the Congo and the results of the Tananarive Conference and renews his demand for Mr. Hammarskjöld's removal as Secretary General . . . US delegate Adlai Stevenson denounces the Gromyko tirade as "wild and irresponsible" and in "the worst and most destructive traditions of the cold war."

Mar. 22: In an interview with *New York Herald Tribune* correspondent Marguerite Higgins, Antoine Gizenga (1) firmly rejects possibility of a political compromise within the proposed confederation (2) denies having received either equipment, money, or advice from the Communist Bloc; and (3) disputes US press suggestions that he is either a Communist or "Communist-educated."

March 27: The UN announces two moves to help restore peace in the Congo—a "get friendly with the Congolese" order to UN troops, and the setting up of a neutral zone along the explosive border between Ruanda-Urundi and Kivu province.

Vol. 6, No. 4

AFRICA REPORT is published monthly at Suite 505, Dupont Circle Building, Washington 6, D. C.

Cable: AFRAM, WASHINGTON

Editorial Staff: Helen Kitchen, Editor; Gayle Quisenberry, Editorial Assistant; Constantine O'Neill, Production Manager; Harvey Glickman, Book Editor; Okon Idem, Library.

Africa Report welcomes but cannot assume responsibility for unsolicited manuscripts.

© The African-American Institute, Inc., 1961

Articles in Africa Report are independently selected and edited by the editor and do not necessarily reflect the views of the African-American Institute.

Second Class postage paid at Washington, D. C. SUBSCRIPTION PRICE: Surface mail: U. S. \$1.00; Foreign 8/. Air Rates: U. S. \$3.00; Foreign \$4.90.

Sierra Leone: Independence Without Pain

By ROY LEWIS*

On April 27, 1961, a new West African nation will enter the stage of world affairs; it will replace South Africa as the twelfth member of the British Commonwealth, and will probably become the 100th member of the United Nations. Sierra Leone's coming-of-age deserves special interest in the United States because its foundation in 1787 is interwoven with the skeins of American history. For the beautiful, thundery "Mountains of the Lion" off the flat mangrove-fringed coasts of West Africa were selected by the Anti-Slavery Society to settle a number of freed slaves from eighteenth-century England and America. Moreover, its mighty harbor, Freetown, was the base from which Her Majesty's frigates and gunboats intercepted the slave ships and eventually put down the trade.

Location Enhances Importance

Sierra Leone is a relatively small country by the standard of the independent African countries *de l'expression anglaise*, as the phrase now goes, but it is well up to the average of the states that have emerged from the break-up of the French colonial empire in Africa. Its population is over 2,000,000, about the same as its ex-French neighbor, Guinea, and rather larger than that of its other neighbor, Liberia, whose history is also closely associated with the slave trade and the first aspirations of African nationalism. Sierra Leone is smaller than either of its neighbors—about the size of the state of South Carolina; but because it is wedged between two states representing opposite ends of the African political spectrum, it is of some considerable political importance. Its harbor is the finest in West Africa, though the British never made it into the base that the French made of Dakar.

The past always lives to some extent in the present, and Sierra Leone's past cannot be forgotten in considering its potentialities. Though the colony dates from 1787, the country as a whole did not become a British possession until the 1890's, when a large area of the hinterland behind the colony area was declared a protectorate, and treaties were made with about 150 small chieftaincies, belonging to perhaps 20 major tribal and linguistic groupings.

This is important for several reasons. The small colony was, though

rather poor, deeply anglicized. The "creoles", though almost wholly African in blood (they had some admixture of English and West Indian ancestry), were detribalized, relatively prosperous, sophisticated, and educated. They thought of the tribal Africans as "bush savages," and in return were called "black Englishmen." "The Protectorate" as such was administered separately from the Colony until very recently; English common law and freehold prevailed in the colony, codified native customary law mainly in the Protectorate, where land was communally owned and, ironically enough, some local domestic slavery persisted until 1928. For Sierra Leone to become a nation, this division has had to be overcome: the creoles, now only about 80,000 in number, had to become one with "the natives" and the tribes had to lose their separateness from each other (though this latter process is far from complete). In the past 60 years, the economic process has been one of opening up the interior and uncovering its wealth, both agricultural and mineral, for the good of the whole territory.

Boundaries Firm

Sierra Leone, physically, is a more soundly delineated area than many African states, for it is bounded by the sea and the crescent of mountains which form the headwaters of its own many fine rivers on the western side, and of the Niger which flows eastwards. The country is a vast draining-board tilted towards the Atlantic, well-watered, hot, and so located that it can grow a great range of tropical produce in a varied climate at the junction of the true tropical forest belt and the savannah belt. Ethnically, it is not quite so self-contained, though only one major tribe—the Mende—overlaps largely into neighboring Liberia.

The Protectorate was developed, outwards, from Freetown (and Bonthe, a now moribund port). It was slow work, because of the backwardness of the people by European standards, lack of communications, and the difficulty, at first, of finding any export crops; when palm produce became the territory's staple, the prohibition of land alienation left its cultivation entirely to the African chieftains, and this was not very efficient. Development was also retarded by World War I, and then by the depression; but in the 1930's, cobalt, diamonds, and iron ore were discovered, and the mining of these, together with the development of new tropical crops—swamp rice, cocoa, coffee, ginger, piassava, benniseed, etc.—began rapidly to transform the country, a process which received immense impetus



after the war, when diamonds were found not to be confined to the single area, Kono, where they were first discovered, but all down the estuaries of the rivers that drain the country.

This rapid economic growth, though painful in many ways, transformed the country politically. First of all, it put wealth into the hands of the tribes of the hinterland, so that the creoles became, in many ways, the poor relations. Secondly, this wealth began to break up the bonds of tribalism, further undermining the foundations of chieftaincy which British rule was already transforming. Thirdly, in letting news, movement, and ideas flow in the Protectorate, it spread the gospel of African nationalism—which at first was taken up by creole intellectuals, who became the first teachers of the tribesmen. A strong Protectorate movement, headed by some of the chiefs, began to press for more responsible rule and for freedom—not merely from British control, but more particularly from "creole" privilege in Freetown and the Colony area.

After World War II, Britain acknowledged the propriety of all this, and set up a Protectorate assembly; the Colony, like nearly all British colonies in the West Indies and elsewhere, had had a measure of popular representation from the nineteenth century. In the past decade, Sierra Leone's political history has been the usual British colonial one of a succession of constitutions, each more liberal than the last, paving the way steadily towards fully democratic institutions and independence, under the pressure of a nationalist party. But in Sierra Leone this has been complicated (as in Ghana it was not) by jealousies between the creole-ruled Colony and the Protectorate.

It is the signal triumph of the

* Roy Lewis, formerly chief African correspondent of the London Economist, is the author of the definitive book on Sierra Leone, *Sierra Leone: A Modern Portrait* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1954). Mr. Lewis has recently taken over as head of the Economist's Washington, DC office.

Sierra Leone

Capital:	Freetown (population 100,000)
Area:	27,924 square miles (Colony: 256 square miles, Protectorate: 26,669 square miles)
Population:	2,260,000 (mid-1958 estimate)
Official Language:	English. (Mende is the principal local language in the south, and Temne in the north.)
1958 Imports:	£23,950,000, chiefly manufactured goods, machinery, fuel oils, cement.
1958 Exports:	£19,600,000, chiefly diamonds, iron ore, palm kernels, coffee, cocoa, kola nuts.
Budget (1959-60):	Revenue, £11,488,000 Expenditures, £12,286,000
Principal Occupation:	Agriculture

present Prime Minister, Sir Milton Margai, that in the building of the nationalist party (the Sierra Leone Peoples' Party), he has successfully brought together the majority of the creoles, the traditional chiefs, and the politically-conscious masses of the Protectorate. His work of unification is an astonishing political feat, and it alone entitles "the doctor" (as he is affectionately called—he is, in fact, an Edinburgh-trained medical practitioner) to be described as father of his country. He is a Mende.

A Unitary State

Sierra Leone has developed, under British tutelage, as a unitary country like Ghana, not a federal state on the Nigerian pattern. The creoles have retained, however, a certain advantage in representation, and the chiefs also have a reserved place in the assembly; if this is not an exact one-man one-vote equal-district type of representation on the Westminster model (and therefore much criticized by the young radicals), it in fact is not far off it, and takes account of historical factors that cannot yet be ignored.

In the final phase before independence, which has lasted since May 1960, the Governor has only had minimum reserved powers, and Sir Milton has run the country with a cabinet drawn from both the SLPP and the opposition factions. The existence of one small opposition group, not represented in the present government, preserves the essentials of a party system—so far at least. Parallel with this constitutional development has gone the steady "africanization" of the civil service, as fast as the growth of schools and higher education permitted. Sierra Leone's Fourah Bay University—the first institution of higher education in Africa—was founded as a college in 1824 by the Church Missionary Society and raised to full university status in 1960.

Economically, the country has done well, and is now fairly prosperous. Its annual budget is around \$30,000,000; its exports from January to Sep-

tember 1960 were \$51,849,076 and its imports, \$53,189,480—a rapid increase since 1947. In addition to the minerals mentioned above, rutile has been discovered and is being worked, and bauxite is being investigated, but iron and diamonds remain the twin pillars of the state.

Unquestionably, Sierra Leone needs a great deal of development capital. The extension of its iron extraction industry from Marampa to Tonkolili was unduly delayed (in favor, ironically, of the development of Guinea's hematite ores), and much exploration needs to be done. It is vital that national wealth should expand if the needs of a growing population are to be accommodated, if creative work is to be provided for the young people flowing from the new schools, and if the expansion of education, health, and welfare services is to be sustained.

Diamonds Bring Changes

The great diamond boom has awakened Sierra Leone, once so sleepy, Victorian, and conservative, fully into the modern world. Independence, which has been achieved rapidly, yet with skill and a minimum of disturbances (there have been some), brings a new challenge.

Though in politicians such as his brother Albert Margai, Minister of Natural Resources, Foreign Minister John Karefa-Smart, Minister of Finance Muhammad Sanusi Mustapha, and a dozen others, Sir Milton has a good team, there is still a severe shortage of administrative talent. British expatriates, if in diminishing numbers, will be needed to serve the state for some time in the departments, and technicians may be needed from abroad in increasing numbers, despite the growing outturn of trained Africans from Fourah Bay and British and American universities.

In any analysis of the outlook for Sierra Leone, two dangers that it may be delicate to mention ought to be faced. One is internal. The great diamond boom, and the vast smuggling racket that burgeoned from its

mishandling in 1953-56, put immense wealth into the hands of the Lebanese and Syrian trading community. This community is not noted for its wisdom or public spirit, and is concerned to keep its gains less by wise entrepreneurship than by judicious influencing of local African leaders. These may not be wholly taken in; but the fact remains that, the British having egregiously failed to make the Lebanese community pay its full share of the tax burden, the Africans must now do so—or risk becoming puppets of an expatriate plutocracy. The Lebanese have performed a valuable role in the Sierra Leone economy—but today they risk becoming an object of jealousy and dislike as a barrier to African traders.

Guinea Would Influence

The second danger is external, and is complementary to the first: Guinea has certainly every intention of exerting increasing influence on its neighbor, which it regards as very backward in terms of Africanism. Sierra Leone has free institutions—a British-type judiciary, a representative house with an opposition, a free (if inadequate) press, a western tradition more deeply rooted than in most parts of Africa. But is this enough? Young Sierra Leonians, educated abroad and sensitive of Africa's revolution, are restive and critical; since they will soon be in politics, the days of moderation may be numbered. The Soviets are concentrating their efforts in making Guinea a "show place." There will be a very direct rivalry and contrast between Guinea and Sierra Leone in the next few years, between the fruits of the democratic, liberal, British-colonial and Commonwealth method, and the authoritarian (though also African) method of Sekou Toure and his colleagues.

To sustain its sovereignty—including its small army and its new diplomatic establishment—Sierra Leone will need an expanding budget, and more external aid than the £7,500,000 which Britain gave it as a farewell present. What will take the place of the "Colonial Development and Welfare" funds which now automatically cease? To pay for the heavy cost of economic and social development—even now, barely five percent of the former Protectorate people are literate, compared with 80 percent or so in the former Colony—swift aid, in loans and technical assistance, are required. In my view, the most vital sectors are education—where the need is greatest for teachers and teacher-training—and agriculture. Despite a good deal of agricultural progress, especially in mechanized swamp rice cultivation, the export potential is far from realized, while the many unsolved problems of keeping tropical land fertile cry for urgent investigation. A series of comprehensive studies has been made; what is now needed is men, organization, energy—and money.



James Gichuru (striped shirt) and Tom Mboya (striped robe) at a poll rally in Africa Stadium, Nairobi.

—Kenya Information Services



Left to right: KANU President James Gichuru; KADU Deputy Leader Masinde Muliro; KADU Leader Ronald Ngala; and KANU General Secretary Tom Mboya.

—East African Newspapers Ltd.

Report From Kenya

By CARL G. ROSBERG, Jr.*

Nairobi

On February 27, 1961, polling ended in Kenya's first General Election ever held on a common roll basis. The most significant result of this prolonged and complicated election has been the widespread recognition that a new political era has decisively come into being. While the beginning of this new era actually dates back at least to the Lancaster House agreement of February 1960, it was the election of an African majority to the Legislative Council which dramatically illustrated that a fundamental shift in power is taking place.

Nearly 900,000 people of all races voted in the selection of the 53 members of the new Legislative Council. Africans were elected to 33 positions—all of the so-called "open seats". This was expected, since all of the constituencies are fundamentally African rural and urban areas. In six of these constituencies, the African candidates were returned unopposed, but in all other constituencies, even in the remote areas of the Northern Province West, the elections were keenly fought.

Personalities Predominate

On the whole, the personal attributes and ability of the candidates were of far greater importance than party organization. Neither of the two main African parties—the Kenya African National Union, led by James Gichuru and Tom Mboya, and the Kenya African Democratic Union, led by Ronald Ngala and Masinde Muliro—was prepared to conduct an effective, colony-wide campaign. Nonetheless, one of the fruitful results of the election was the sense of political participation experienced for the first time by most Africans.

Twenty of the 53 constituencies were specifically reserved for non-African representatives in the new constitution—10 Europeans, 8 Asians, and 2 Arabs. The candidates for these "reserved" seats had been previously selected in a primary communal election held during January. In the general election, the African vote was crucial in the choice of the

*Carl G. Rosberg, an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California, is now in Kenya on a special research project. He also spent 1954-55 in Kenya as a Ford Foundation Fellow, and during 1955 and 1957 travelled extensively throughout Africa.

elected representatives from minority communities in half of these "reserved" constituencies. Despite the open dislike by a majority of European voters of the introduction of these "reserved constituencies" in place of straight racial representation, there can be little doubt that they have been basically successful in acting as a bridge between the long-established system of exclusive racial electoral rolls and the demand by African political leaders for a purely common roll election. Moreover, Africans have shown their readiness to support overwhelmingly those European and Asian candidates in the "reserved constituencies" who appeared willing to cooperate with them in a common effort to achieve national sovereignty and racial integration.

Thus, the day of effective racial fronts by minorities has ended. It is extremely unlikely that in Kenya's next election any provision will be made for special representation of minority community interests.

Prospects For Stability

It is still unclear how an effective and stable government is to be formed. Superficially the election appeared to be a test of strength between KANU and KADU. Although each party sought to conduct a colony-wide campaign, only a few tribal areas were ever in doubt as to their party allegiance. The results, therefore, produced few surprises, and KANU easily emerged the dominant party, gaining 19 of the 33 open seats and winning half of all votes cast in the election.

KADU failed to capture either of two important urban constituencies of Nairobi East and Mombasa West. Winning less than 16 percent of the vote—although it gained 12 seats partly because of the manner in which the constituencies were drawn—it remains a weak, tribally-based, and fundamentally rural party incapable

of commanding majority support from the African population.

Although the center of elective power rests clearly with KANU, it is not a united party easily capable of translating its electoral victory into governmental power. Two factors largely account for KANU's instability—the struggle for power among its leadership and the still-unanswered question of Jomo Kenyatta's release from restrictive status in the northern remote part of Kenya. Prospects of a stable and workable government clearly revolve around the settlement of these two issues.

Inroads Against Tribalism

The problem of leadership within KANU is not new, but has been an inherent part of the party since its formation after the Lancaster House Conference. During the election it was intensified and the dissension nearly split the party. The most dramatic illustration of this disunity was the election for the Nairobi East constituency—"the nerve center" of Kenya African politics. Tom Mboya, a member of the Luo tribe and KANU's national General Secretary, had been chosen as the official party candidate, but at the last moment he was opposed by a well-known Kikuyu, Dr. Munyua Waiyaki, who at the time was chairman of KANU's Nairobi Branch. Subsequently, Dr. Waiyaki was expelled from the party, but nonetheless was openly supported by KANU's national Vice-President, Oginga Odinga, and by what appeared to be a formidable array of leading KANU Kikuyu political leaders. Sixty percent of the Nairobi East electorate were Kikuyu, and the main appeal of Mboya's opponents was cast basically in terms of tribal loyalty. Their objective was to defeat their major obstacle to a position of dominance in the party and country.

In both respects they failed, for—

to the surprise of outside observers as well as Africans—Mboya achieved the most significant victory of the election by capturing 90 percent of the votes in his constituency. This achievement is a personal one and indicative of Mboya's great organizational skill. It is also, however, a tribute to the political maturity of the Kikuyu electorate of Nairobi. Their votes for Luo-born Mboya were a major blow against tribalism and suggest that a new and significant opportunity exists to build a common loyalty and common citizenship among Kenya's people during this critical period of political change.

The continued restriction of Jomo Kenyatta plagues the prospects of Tom Mboya and KANU's Kikuyu president, James Gichuru (who actively supported Mboya in the Nairobi East election) in attempting to translate this victory into a position of commanding leadership.

Throughout the campaign, the release of Kenyatta from restriction has been a key issue. KANU has been adamant in demanding his immediate unconditional release and in refusing to participate in the new government without his release; KADU leaders have been less militant in their demands but have felt compelled to use the issue as part of their campaign platform; most Asian candidates have supported his release; and the European New Kenya Party candidates have had to express their willingness to work in a government under Kenyatta's leadership.

Kenyatta Issue Still Vital

Immediately after the elections, the Governor announced that Kenyatta's release would not be effected until a government had been formed and found workable. In the same speech, he offered a mild compromise by stating that Kenyatta would be moved to a place of restriction slightly less inaccessible than heretofore, and that, after a government was formed, African government Ministers, religious leaders, and, at a later date, journalists, would be allowed to ascertain his views and intentions.

This statement was not only viewed as a grave disappointment by KANU leaders in particular, but also as a barrier to their cooperating with the colonial administration in an attempt to form a government. However, the Governor modified his original statement two days later and granted the request of KANU's President and General Secretary (Gichuru and Mboya) and KADU's Leader and Deputy Leader (Ngala and Muliro) to visit Kenyatta before a decision on the formation of a government must be taken.

On March 23, after leaders of both parties had made their pilgrimage to see Kenyatta, Gichuru announced that neither KANU nor KADU would cooperate with the Governor in forming a government until Kenyatta is released.

(Continued on page 15)

Results of the Kenya Elections

	No. of Votes	No. of Seats
Kenya African National Union (African)	467,474	19
Kenya African Democratic Union (African) ..	142,580	12
New Kenya Party (European)	28,284	4
Kenya Coalition (European)	8,891	3
Kenya Indian Congress (Asian, non-Moslem) ..	10,487	3
Kenya Freedom Party (Asian, non-Moslem) ..	5,258	1
Coast Peoples' Party (Arab)	1,693	0
Independents	187,921	9
Baluyia Political Union (African)	28,817	1
Kenya National Congress (African)	4,561	0
Tana River Pokomo Union (African)	699	0
Shungwaya Freedom Party (African)	3,748	1
Total	890,413	53

Egypt Discovers Africa

By MANFRED HALPERN*

Cairo

When President Nasir within the past four months visited both the Sudan and Morocco, a spate of articles appeared in the world press excitedly commenting on Egypt's bid for leadership in Africa.

In fact, these visits were Nasir's first to any African state and Egypt still knows surprisingly little about Africa. Only within the last year did Cairo University convert its Sudan Institute into an autonomous Institute of African Studies for post-graduate study and research by Egyptians. Its library and resources for documentation remain slim. Its teaching of African languages remains a project for the future. The Egyptian regime has not yet begun to study the domestic political experience of other African countries that use organizations and devices similar to those of the United Arab Republic for achieving rapid social and economic progress.

Experts Are Few

There are no "old Africa hands" in Egypt and President Nasir's principal advisers on Africa, especially Dr. Murad Ghaleb, the former UAR Ambassador to the Congo, and Mohammad Faik, are among the very few Egyptians who consistently follow African affairs. African assignments are apparently still considered hardship posts for UAR diplomats: they receive a special bonus of a three months holiday every year. A monthly magazine, *African Awakening*, is now being published in Arabic to stimulate interest in their continent among Egyptians. A magazine in English, intended primarily for Africans, is being planned. The first large-scale Egyptian trade mission left for 11 countries in West and East Africa in March, partly to find markets for Egypt's growing volume of manufactured goods and partly to counteract Israeli efforts.

Cairo is the largest city, Egypt the second most populous country in Africa. Egypt was the first country on that continent to free itself from European rule (barring Liberia and Ethiopia, which never really experienced it) and the first to join a social revolution to its nationalist revolution. But it was not until the present century was half over that Egypt began to take serious note that most of its territory is located on the African continent.

The first Egyptian political ex-

*Manfred Halpern is an Associate Professor in the Department of Politics at Princeton University, specializing in the Middle East. He has just spent several months in Egypt.



UAR President Gamal Abd-al Nasir at the Casablanca Conference in January with the late King Mohammad V of Morocco.

—Wide World Photo

plorations during the 1950's were in fact confined to Arab Africa and met with opportunities and obstacles similar to those which exist in the Middle East. Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria welcomed material Egyptian support for their independence movements, but as they moved closer to sovereignty, grew more hesitant to join any federation dominated by the largest of Arab states. Even the hope of North African unity from Morocco to Libya receded as each state discovered its own national interest.

Exiles Silenced

Cairo's diplomatic influence in Arab Africa actually declined for a time until it gradually silenced political exiles from Morocco, Libya, and Tunisia who had found Cairo not only a refuge but an encouraging base of operations. Suspicions lingered in the Sudan even after Egypt yielded its formal claim to possession of that country in 1954 until, in 1958, it also ended its open and covert interventions in Sudanese internal affairs. Tunisia ended its three-year old boycott of Arab League affairs in January 1961 only after Egypt promised to end its support for Salah Ben

Youssef, an exile who, according to Tunisian courts, had conspired from Cairo in several plots to assassinate President Bourghiba.

Nasir at Bandung

Opportunities for Egyptian contacts with the rest of Africa have opened up only in very recent years. On the occasion of the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian states in 1955, when President Nasir first extended his interest beyond Arab affairs, only Ethiopia, Liberia, and Ghana could be counted among the independent, non-Arab states of Africa.

What are President Nasir's objectives in Africa? First of all, Egypt would like to see its African, no less than its Middle Eastern, neighbors free from colonial controls, capable of resolving all regional problems by their own efforts, and influential enough in the United Nations to make that organization the guardian of, rather than the substitute for, regional solutions.

Egypt's diplomatic and material support for Lumumba in the Congo fully illustrates Egypt's position. Egypt prefers a strong, centralized regime because it believes that the

persistence of regional factionalism encourages the Great Powers to intervene, and thus splinter Africa in the entangling alliances of the cold war. Cairo feared Lumumba's Soviet friends less than Mobutu's Belgian friends because it considers that a leader dependent on Belgium and anti-Communism could never lead the Congo toward independence or solidarity with the rest of Africa. Instead, Egypt has confidence, based not only on Mr. Nasir's own experience but also on that of Premier Kassim in Iraq and President Toure in Guinea, that an independent leader can safely enhance his strength and freedom by utilizing both Soviet and Western assistance. And it refuses to support a UN army that, in its view, frustrates Soviet designs upon the Congo only at the cost of also frustrating this African design for Africa.

Limitations Shown

At the Casablanca Conference early this January, five African states, not without considerable discussion, endorsed this position. The Conference, however, also illuminated some of the limitations hampering Egypt's role in Africa. The five—Morocco, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, and Mali—proclaimed an "African Charter" looking toward the creation of an African Consultative Assembly, African Political, Economic, and Cultural Committees, and a Joint African High Command. But Casablanca provided only a small base on which to build such structures. Libya and the Provisional Government of Algeria sent observers, but the majority of independent African states—including Nigeria, Liberia, Ethiopia, the Sudan, Tunisia and most of the French-speaking countries of Black Africa—declined to come. Some did not wish to give their Moroccan host the expected present of a resolution against Mauritanian independence; others had unresolved quarrels with Egypt; some were not ready for unilateral African action on the Congo crisis; others believed that any African conference to which all African states would not come was ill-prepared and ill-advised.

Thus Egypt is pursuing a line that could easily and persistently foil its larger designs as similar policies have helped foil past Western policies in both Africa and the Middle East. For the sake of quickly fashioning an alliance on larger issues, promises of support are given on local border disputes or in regional rivalries, and soon the alliance is remodeled by the daily burden of the smaller issues, and enemies are made on quite unintentional grounds. In Africa's telescoped history, the age of mutual exploration by Africans allows for little of the political innocence that accompanied European exploration. The Africans to be encountered today are not tribes but governments.

Egypt in Africa, as in the Middle

East, is following a policy of sponsoring bold action even at the risk of temporarily creating disunity. Such a policy could pay off in the long run, as champions of more radical action come to power elsewhere and seek unity on the basis of common and fundamental sympathies. Boldness merely as a favorite style of action, however, has left Egypt with the embarrassing task of disbanding various exile groups in Cairo—most recently the late Dr. Felix Moumie's *Union Populaire Camerounaise*—as the Ambassador from the newly independent country (but not necessarily from a government representative of the exiles) arrives to present his credentials. The violently abusive language still being used by a dozen exile groups over Cairo's "Voice of Free Africa" in broadcasting to colonial areas may well help generally to encourage a spirit of intransigent violence and, much to Mr. Nasir's chagrin, could lead to repetitions of the Congo pattern.

Nationalism Over Islam

Despite recently published reports, Egypt is likely to be more cautious in becoming a partisan of Islam in Africa than in acting as a champion of African nationalism. The shrewd Major Ahmed Abdullah Toema, who marshalled Egypt's labor unions in support of Mr. Nasir before becoming the UAR's Minister of Culture and Religious Instruction, is doubtless aware that his projected "Voice of Islam" cannot risk broadcasts which, in the view of the new secular governments of East and West Africa, set Moslem against pagan, agnostic, or Christian and prevent their common mobilization for national unity and reconstruction.

Hopeful of becoming the leader of the entire Arab world, the Egyptian regime also tends to be more cautious than the leaders of Tunisia, Turkey, or Pakistan in publicly advocating reforms, even if its actual practice is scarcely conservative. The "Voice of Islam" will therefore be compelled to tread a rather narrow path, attacking Western missionaries rather than Christians, upholding Islamic tolerance and flexibility rather than the uniqueness of its revelation. These same limitations may also keep Egypt, despite current talk, from sending "religious attaches" to every UAR Embassy in Africa.

The attraction of Cairo's Al-Azhar, Islam's oldest religious university, is so great that many more than the 2,000 Africans to whom the Egyptian Government has recently given scholarships come by foot and under great hardships to clamor for admission. They are likely to discover, however, that Al-Azhar does not draw Egypt's best students, does not supply graduates for its most significant jobs, and no longer shapes the dominant spirit of the country. They are bound to make similar discoveries in their own

countries as they return home. The present Egyptian regime has no desire to reverse this trend anywhere in Africa. It may well have to modernize Al-Azhar's curriculum further lest its present popularity lead to later discontent.

Egypt is certainly aware of these dangers. If it tends to underrate them, it is because Egypt's interests as an African power remain subordinate to, and indeed are motivated by, its interests as an Arab power. For the Arab world, it is enough that Nasir received the biggest demonstration at Casablanca and became one of the architects of an "African Charter." What Africans were absent does not yet seem to matter.

Israel Is Real Issue

At Casablanca, moreover, Mr. Nasir scored points against a new challenge in Africa that deeply moves most Arabs. Israel has been winning friends in Africa through technical assistance and trade. Syrian and Lebanese traders, long ensconced in Africa, have experienced a new competition. Egypt has exported teachers, doctors, engineers, or weapons to Somalia, Sudan, Libya, and Algeria, but further south, especially in Ghana, Nigeria, Mali, and former French Congo, it has not been able to outbid Israel.

At Casablanca, Nasir succeeded in winning Ghanaian, Guinean, and Malian endorsement for a resolution which "denounces Israel as an instrument in the service of imperialism and neo-colonialism not only in the Middle East but also in Africa and Asia." But the resolution calls upon African states only to "oppose" this Israeli policy. South of Arab Africa, the Arab-Israeli conflict may well continue to seem more distant than the Soviet-Western conflict, and similarly not without some advantageous by-products. What counts for Egypt now, however, is that its leadership in Africa appears to give added warrant for its leadership in the Arab world, and that Egyptians, struggling to raise their income to \$200 a person in the next decade, meanwhile have cause to experience a sense of pride.

Egypt knows that it cannot become the leader of a united Africa. It is not black, like the African majority. Its own first loyalty is to the Arab nation. It expects other regional groupings to emerge in Africa, though it is obviously opposed to any based on an "African personality" or "Negritude" that excludes Arab Africa. Implicit in the Egyptian concept of regionalism, therefore, is shared leadership, with the UAR as the leading Arab spokesman and liaison with the Middle East. While the Arab world remains disunited and new states in Africa are still to be born, Egypt can expect many frustrations no less than opportunities in Africa. Neither deserves to be exaggerated.

News Review

Tanganyika's Freedom Set for December 28

December 28, 1961 was named the target date for Tanganyika's independence in an announcement by British Colonial Secretary Iain Macleod on March 29 following talks with Chief Minister Julius Nyerere and his government in Dar-es-Salaam. However, Mr. Nyerere—whose Tanganyika African National Union won an overwhelming victory in 1959 general elections—will assume the title of "Prime Minister" on May 1 when Tanganyika is to enter the last pre-independence stage, full internal self-government.

The 361,800 square mile territory on the East African coast was part of German East Africa before World War I. Since then it has been administered by Britain, first under a League of Nations mandate and since World War II as a United Nations trusteeship. Tanganyika is expected to become the thirteenth member of the Commonwealth after independence.

News Spotlight Shifts To Portuguese Africa

An estimated 3500 Portuguese settlers fled from outlying districts to Luanda, the capital of Angola, during two days of African rioting, March 15 and 16. Deaths are set at 150. The attacks were centered in the Congo and Sao Salvador districts of northern Angola, near the border of the former Belgian Congo. In most cases the attackers appeared to be members of the Bakongo tribe, which is scattered through the Congo and northern Angola. On March 20, the Portuguese Army took over full responsibility for public security in the three northernmost provinces.

Portuguese authorities said that the riots were fomented by agitators from the Congo. This charge was denied in New York by Holden Roberto, exiled leader of the Union of Angolan Peoples, who said it was a local protest against Portuguese forced labor schemes. A sharp fall in coffee prices in the district, and resulting economic distress, was cited as the immediate cause by some observers.

On the same day that the rioting broke out, the United States supported a Security Council resolution jointly sponsored by Liberia, Ceylon, and the United Arab Republic criticizing Portuguese rule in Angola. Though the resolution failed to carry, it marked the first time that the US has rejected Portugal's contention that its overseas territories were an integral part of the country, and thus immune from foreign criticism.

Voting for the resolution were Liberia, Ceylon, United Arab Republic, the Soviet Union and the United States; there were no negative votes, but the United Kingdom, France, Turkey, Ecuador, Chile, and Nationalist China abstained.

Meanwhile, the *New York Times* reported on March 20 that the Portuguese Government is now giving priority attention to developing plans for "sweeping constitutional changes" in Angola and Mozambique to ward off moves to reform the Portuguese colonies "violently".

Marathon Treason Trial Ends in South Africa

The 28 South Africans on trial since 1956 for high treason were found not guilty on March 29 and discharged. The presiding judge, Justice F. L. H. Rumpff, said in Pretoria that the evidence presented did not prove that the African National Congress had acquired or adopted a policy to overthrow the state by violence. He said that the evidence indicated that the ANC and specifically the accused were working to replace the present form of state with a radically and fundamentally different form of state, but it was not proved that the form of state pictured or propagated was a Communist state.

The Associated Press reported from Pretoria that the verdict—a unanimous decision by a three-judge tribunal—was regarded as a stunning defeat for Prime Minister Hendrik F. Verwoerd's government. Of the 140 persons originally arrested in December 1956, 92 were charged with high treason and committed for trial. Charges were subsequently dropped, however, against 61 of these.

Democratic Party Wins In First Uganda Election

Uganda took another step toward self-government March 21-25, when the British protectorate's first country-wide elections were held under constitutional reforms introduced in 1960. Although the Democratic Party, led by Benedicto Kiwanuka, came out second-best in the popular vote, it won 43 of the 82 Legislative Council seats contested, while A. M. Obote's Uganda People's Congress won 35. The Uganda National Congress gained one seat, two went to independents, and one remains to be filled because of the death of a candidate.

The Democratic Party's victory on the basis of a minority vote—490,808 against the UPC's 687,368—was due to the fact that Catholics

predominated among the few thousand citizens of Buganda Province who defied the boycott of the national elections imposed by the separatist-minded provincial regime of Kabaka Frederick Mutesa II. Twenty out of 21 Buganda seats went to the Democratic Party. This party was founded in 1956 by a group of Roman Catholics, the largest single religious group in the country. Its membership is still heavily Catholic, although it put up some Protestant and Moslem candidates in some constituencies, and is trying to break away from the confessional label.

The Uganda People's Congress was formed in 1960 by a merger of a section of the Uganda National Congress—then the leading party in the country—with a group of Uganda Legislative Council members called the Uganda People's Union. It is strongly committed to the end of Buganda separatism, early independence, and the creation of an East African Federation.

South Africa Cuts Tie With Commonwealth

Prime Minister Hendrik F. Verwoerd on March 15 formally withdrew South Africa's application to continue as a member of the Commonwealth after the Union becomes a republic in May. With the loss of South Africa, however, the Commonwealth will continue to have 12 members since Ghana, Nigeria, India, Malaya, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, United Kingdom, Pakistan, Ceylon, and Cyprus will presumably be joined by Sierra Leone when it becomes independent in April.

Verwoerd's decision to cut the tie with the Commonwealth climaxed three days of heated discussion of South Africa's racial policies by the heads of the Commonwealth nations at their annual meeting in London. Britain's Prime Minister Harold Macmillan failed in an effort to find a formula that would keep South Africa in the organization and allow other members to criticize its policies in a joint resolution.

Afro-Asian leaders in the Commonwealth renewed their attack on the Union and reportedly demanded assurance, as a *quid pro quo* for continued affiliation, that its policies would change. Verwoerd is reported to have counter-attacked angrily, pointing out there was discrimination in other Commonwealth countries too. In the end, criticizing the "vindictiveness" and "hostility" of the other leaders and calling the Union's departure a "regrettable step," he explained that he was withdrawing the South African application to re-

News Review

move the pressure on Macmillan in his role as a buffer between South Africa and its critics.

Verwoerd said he hoped that South Africa's ties with Britain, its main trade customer, would remain strong, and affirmed that his country would remain within the sterling area. If Britain continues to give South Africa Commonwealth-like tariff preference (as it does to Eire and Burma, which also left the association), the trade share should not be greatly affected. Since Macmillan believes that the only way to influence South Africa to amend its policies is to maintain contact, this seems likely.

At home there was shock among the English-speaking white South Africans, and some panic selling on the Johannesburg stock exchange. Albert Luthuli, head of the African National Congress, applauded the solution as evidence of the Commonwealth's disapproval. There were widespread reports that Verwoerd would go to the country in a general election later this year.

Mauritania Frees Opposition Leaders

Mauritanian Prime Minister Moktar Ould Daddah has announced the release of five leaders of the opposition Nahda Party placed under open arrest shortly before the independence celebrations in November 1960. In a communique issued on February 28, the leaders denied reports that they favored a union with Morocco and announced their intention to enter into a constructive opposition in a national framework.

Cameroun Protests February Plebiscite

Cameroun has formally appealed to the United Nations to declare null and void the plebiscite held in the Northern British Cameroons on February 7, claiming that the registered decision of the Northern Cameroonians to merge with Nigeria was the result of "undemocratic irregularities" in the organization and conduct of the vote by local officials. Dr. Djalal Abdo of Iran, who supervised the referendum in both the Northern and Southern Cameroons, reported that the "operation was carried out in an orderly fashion and without incidents."

According to the final rounded-off election figures, 140,000 Northern Cameroonians voted to join Nigeria and 98,000 voted to unite with the Cameroun Republic. In the Southern Cameroons, 232,000 opted for union with Cameroun and 139,000 for union with Nigeria. The Northern Cam-

eroons is largely Moslem, and its addition to the Republic of Cameroun would have greatly strengthened the shaky position of the republic's Moslem president, Ahmadou Ahidjo.

Zanzibar Party Impasse Requires New Elections

Because of the indecisive results of the Zanzibar general elections of January 17 and the refusal of the two major political parties to join in a coalition government, a caretaker regime has been established pending new elections tentatively scheduled for June. On February 23, the Zanzibar Legislative Council approved the appointment of G. C. Lawrence, the Civil and Financial Secretary of the Zanzibar Government, as Chief Minister for a maximum of six months, and invited the Afro-Shirazi Party and Zanzibar Nationalist Party to appoint two Ministers each to the caretaker regime. The Afro-Shirazis won 10 seats and the opposing Nationalists nine in the January balloting, but the Afro-Shirazis' victory hung on one vote—and that disputed—in a Pemba constituency. (See *Africa Report*, February 1961, page 11)

Views Differ Sharply on Tananarive Proposals

There was general agreement that the conference held in Tananarive, Malgache Republic, in mid-March by the Congo's various separatist leaders (see *Congo Chronology*, page 2) was a significant milestone, but interpretations of the significance varied sharply.

At one end of the spectrum of commentators were those who saw the agreement to reorganize the Congo into a loosely-held confederation of tribally-based states as a promising adjustment to the realities of present political development in the Congo. Some even went so far as to suggest that the agreement represented a sufficient degree of consensus among the Congolese leadership to cause the UN to consider the possibility of soon restricting its role in the former Belgian territory to that of technical assistance.

Others were not so sanguine about either the precedent of a few leaders arbitrarily carving up an independent state under the very nose of the UN or about the outlook for a dismembered Congo. They noted that President Kasavubu in effect yielded all his effective power in order to achieve the "reintegration" of seceded Katanga and South Kasai: the confederation, as conceived at Tananarive, will apparently have neither a central legis-

lature, a functioning national executive, nor a unified army. It will be divided primarily along tribal lines, but none of the sectors will be entirely ethnically solid, and the room for constant maneuvering, intrigue, and new secessionist movements is considerable.

The critics of Tananarive are especially concerned about the frustration which is likely to develop among the waves of educated and largely detribalized young people who will be returning to these various Congo "nations" in the next few years as a result of present crash programs to create a university-educated elite. Confederation and decentralization may settle things for now, but it is a solution which implicitly assumes a static society. The "centralists," pointing to historical parallels in the modern history of China, see the Tananarive solution as an invitation to Communist infiltration over the next 10 years, arguing that it does not provide for the political education and integration of the increasingly more radical younger generation.

Political Changes Due For Republic of Togo

A new electoral law restricting participation in national elections to individuals or parties capable of lining up 50 or more persons to form a single list was enacted by the Parliament of Togo in mid-March. The law was vigorously opposed by the Juvento party and the Democratic Union of Togolese People, who termed it a step toward the establishment of one-party government under Prime Minister Sylvanus Olympio's ruling *Comite de l'Unité Togolaise*.

Other new constitutional changes, including the conversion to a presidential system, are expected to be adopted by a decisive majority in a national referendum called for April 9. The President will be elected for seven years by universal suffrage; he will serve as head of state, chief executive of the government, and commander in chief of the army.

New Gabon Constitution Strengthens Executive

The new constitution of Gabon, adopted by acclamation of the National Assembly February 20, calls for a highly-centralized presidential system under which the senior executive is elected for a seven year term by universal suffrage. The President, who is both chief of state and head of government, is authorized to take the initiative in introducing legislation and is entitled both to appeal to the nation by referendum and to

African Political Calendar—

(A tentative list of announced conferences during April and May)

April 8: Proposed meeting of heads-of-state of all independent African nations in Monrovia, Liberia, called by Ivory Coast President Felix Houphouet-Boigny. Agenda: the Congo, Algeria, French nuclear tests in the Sahara, and African cultural and economic cooperation schemes.

April 8: Meeting called for Kamina, Katanga, by provincial President Moise Tshombe to discuss "plans for the next stage of the formation of a Congo federation."

Mid-April: Proposed meeting, in Accra, of the heads-of-state of the "Casa-blanca Powers"—Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, and United Arab Republic. On March 24, it was announced in Tunis that Tunisian President Habib Bourghiba would also attend.

Early May: Proposed meeting in Nigeria of heads-of-state of all independent African nations, called by Nigerian Prime Minister Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa.

May 19-22: Twenty-five press organizations from all parts of Africa to convene in a conference of African journalists in Bamako, Mali, sponsored by the All-African Journalists' Organization.

dissolve Parliament. He may appoint one or two vice presidents who are responsible only to himself.

Leon M'Ba, 59-year old leader of the predominant *Bloc Democratique Gabonaise*, was reelected as chief executive of the republic in a national election on February 12. The single list presented by Gabon's two rival major parties—M'Ba's *Bloc* and the *Union Sociale Gabonaise*—obtained 315,335 votes, officially described as 99.57 percent of the voters. President M'Ba, fulfilling a pre-election promise, announced the appointment of his principal political opponent, the UDSG's Jean Hilaire Aubame, as Minister of Foreign Affairs in a new cabinet of "national union."

France to Continue Aid To Four Entente States

The Commonwealth survived its severest test this month, and looked forward to the early accession of a new African republic in April. The French Community, on the other hand, moved another step toward quiet burial. On March 7, France reached an apparently amicable agreement with four of its former African territories—the Entente states of Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Dahomey, and Niger—on general methods of continuing French technical and financial help despite the refusal of these countries to sign new accords of Community affiliation after their independence in 1960.

Under the broad lines of policy agreed on between General de Gaulle and the four heads of state, France will continue for at least five years to allot funds to the separate states

for special purposes, and will be free to grant or refuse money to specific projects; however, the states themselves will have a free hand in spending such funds. France will furnish the Entente states with teachers, finance the creation of a new African University in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, and will open up its markets to certain agricultural products from these areas. The four will remain in the franc zone. Negotiations on specific accords covering economic, cultural, and defense questions began March 20 in Niamey, Niger.

Only six of the 13 former French colonies which General de Gaulle invited to join the Community in 1958 now regard themselves as affiliated—the Malgache Republic, Senegal, Chad, Central African Republic, Gabon, and Congo (Brazzaville). Guinea turned down membership in the referendum of 1958, Mali did not sign new accords after independence, and Mauritania remains undecided. Neither the full senate nor the heads of state of the Community have been convened in formal session since France gave independence to the last of its African territories in 1960.

Election Boycott In Southern Rhodesia?

The National Democratic Party, principal African nationalist movement in Southern Rhodesia, decided in a seven hour closed session in Bulawayo on March 20 that it would reserve its decision on participating in the June referendum on the constitutional proposals for Southern Rhodesia and the general elections. Although NDP President Joshua

Nkomo reportedly agreed to the compromise proposals reached at the roundtable constitutional conference which ended in Salisbury on February 7, he has since revised his position on the grounds that "no document can be called an agreement where there is a dispute on major issues."

Four conditions for participation were set forth at the Bulawayo meeting:

- That the question of land distribution should be settled to the party's satisfaction.

- That the method of election (or selection) of members of the proposed constitutional council should be agreeable to the NDP.

- That Federal Prime Minister Sir Roy Welensky's government should desist from interference in the Northern Rhodesian constitutional reforms.

- That the Southern Rhodesian Government release all remaining political detainees and permit NDP meetings to be held in the countryside.

Nkrumah Impressed By President Kennedy

Ghana's President Kwame Nkrumah, arriving back in Accra on March 24 from his visit to the United Nations and to the Commonwealth Conference in London, told the crowd which greeted him at the airport that he had been impressed by the "sincerity and dynamic approach" of the new United States administration and by President Kennedy's sympathetic understanding of African policies.

Earlier, during a stopover in Tunis for talks with President Habib Bourghiba, Dr. Nkrumah joined the Tunisian leader in issuing a joint communique "reaffirming" their support of the UN effort in the Congo and of the Algerian nationalist Provisional Government in its negotiations with the French.

Nigerian Government Enters Journalism

The Nigerian Government has announced creation of a new public company, the Nigerian National Press, which will take over the government press building at Apapa to produce a national daily and Sunday newspaper, a weekly, and pamphlets. The daily, to be called the *Nigerian Morning Post*, will give full coverage to "the views and policies of the federal government." First issues of the weekly are planned for May 1961, and the daily will follow "as soon as possible after that." Chief H. O. Davies is chairman and managing director of the new company, and the other directors include three journalists.

ECONOMIC NOTES

Germany and World Bank Study Tanganyika Development

A West German government mission arrived in Tanganyika in early March to examine the role which Germany might play in the three year development plan of the country, which formed the major part of pre-World War I German East Africa. The mission reciprocates a five-day visit to West Germany in January by Chief Minister Julius Nyerere, Minister for Commerce and Industry Nsilo Swai, and Finance Minister Sir Ernest Vasey to discuss possible development of the coal and iron deposits which lie side by side in Tanganyika's southern province. The prospects for mechanization of cashew shelling and further development of rubber growing and manufacturing were also considered. On his return from Bonn, Mr. Nyerere announced a symbolic gift by North Rhine-Westphalia to the people of Tanganyika of 300 plows to assist in the conversion from hoe to plow cultivation.

Meanwhile, the World Bank's mission to Tanganyika has filed an optimistic report on the country's short-term prospects for growth. However, it noted that government expenditures must concentrate on revenue-producing activities and that much financial and technical aid will have to be infused from the outside if Tanganyika is to make effective use of its resources and prosper in the long run. More productive use of the land by peasant agriculture was emphasized by the Bank's experts as a key factor in Tanganyika's development.

Portugal Hopes to Develop African Iron and Manganese

A £16,200,000 project to develop iron ore and manganese in Portuguese West Africa has been reported in the *Financial Times*. The contract to provide railway and other transportation equipment, which add up to slightly over half the project's total cost, has been awarded by the Portuguese Government to Krupp's of Essen, Germany.

Ethiopia Gets Two DLF Loans To Improve Air Transport

Two separate loans totalling \$22,600,000 to aid in the improvement of Ethiopian air transportation facilities were recently announced by the US Government's Development Loan Fund.

The first, dated January 31, was for \$19,500,000 to improve internal communications of this mountainous country by assisting in building or improvement of five major and 22 minor airports. The five major airports are Bole International (Addis

Ababa), Asmara International, Dire Dawa, Jimma, and Bahar Dar. The loans will be used for buying equipment, material, and services in the United States or Ethiopia. An American engineering firm prepared the estimates and will supervise construction; the work will be carried out by United States prime contractors, except for work on the minor airports to be done by the Ministry of Public Works and Communications.

The second loan of \$3,100,000 is to help finance purchase of maintenance and overhaul equipment and parts necessary to support the operation of two jet aircraft being purchased by the Ethiopian Air Lines, Inc. (EAL) with the help of a US Export-Import Bank loan. Studies indicated that EAL could save money by having the jets overhauled in Ethiopia. Some of the funds will be used for necessary passenger and plane handling equipment at EAL stops abroad.

Sinclair Reports Oil Strike Near Capital of Somalia

An oil strike at Coriolei, about 74 miles from Mogadiscio, Somalia, has been reported by drilling teams of the Sinclair Oil Company of New York.

Ghana Offers Generous Terms For Volta River Project Smelter

Ghana's National Assembly has unanimously accepted the terms of the master agreement initialled earlier by the Volta Aluminium Company (VALCO) and the Ghana Government (see *Africa Report*, January 1961, p. 2), which sets out the terms under which the Company is to build and operate the aluminum smelter, a vital part of the projected Volta River development scheme. Details of the agreement have been published in a government white paper.

Observers consider the terms offered to VALCO to be very generous—"pioneer status" for its first 10 years, exempting it from all taxes, including import and export duties and taxes on dividends, and for the next 20 years, VALCO is guaranteed the present level of company tax (a profits tax). At the end of the agreement, which runs for 30 years, VALCO has the option to renew the agreement for 20 more years. The government guarantees not to interfere with the company for the first 30 years, and VALCO owners are assured prompt and just compensation if it were nationalized after that period.

VALCO, on its part, agrees to finance the smelter and guarantees to purchase a stipulated amount of power from the Volta generating plant at a specified rate. This will provide a minimum annual payment of £2,500,000 enabling the government to service the loans which it secured

to build the dam and power plant (*Africa Report*, October 1960, p. 7). The surplus electric power is expected to form a base for the country's industrialization and to be used for village and town electrification.

The consortium is now composed of four major American aluminum producers—Kaiser Aluminum, Aluminum Company of America (ALCOA), Reynolds Metals Co., and Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation. Aluminium Ltd., a Canadian company, has now dropped from the group.

Federation Tightens Controls To Stem Capital Flow

The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland is attempting, by a series of emergency measures, to stem the outflow of capital set in motion by the present political tension. As the result of a directive from the central bank and special legislation enacted by the Federal Parliament, residents must henceforth declare all funds held abroad, and movement of funds to other countries (even including the UK and the Union of South Africa) is blocked. Ceilings are imposed on the amount which can be spent for foreign travel, or sent out of the country as emigrant payments or as education and maintenance payments for dependents. However, the Minister of Finance promised sympathetic treatment for residents who legitimately needed to transfer more, within the limitations of the country's foreign exchange position.

The departure from previous policy lies mainly in the restrictions on current transfers, and on capital transfers to the UK and other sterling area countries. No limitations were previously imposed on such transfers, although capital transfers to non-sterling area countries have been controlled in accord with the general sterling area policy. The new controls do not apply to non-resident companies and individuals, and outgoing payments of interest, dividends and profits to non-residents will be authorized.

Mali Gets \$44,800,000 Credit In New Pact With Soviet Union

The Soviet news agency TASS reported on March 18 the signature of an agreement for economic and technical cooperation with Mali under which the West African republic will receive a long-term credit of 40,000,000 rubles (about \$44,800,000). The credit will be used by Soviet organizations employed to give technical assistance in prospecting for oil, gold, and diamonds, constructing a cement works, and improving navigation conditions on the Niger River. The agreement also calls for "cultural cooperation" during 1961.

—Norman W. Mosher

Spotlight on Little-Known Areas

By HARVEY GLICKMAN

Book Editor

The Emerging States of French Equatorial Africa, by Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff (*Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960*), 595 pages, \$8.75.

Former French Equatorial Africa may have to await a protracted political crisis to make its dent on the American consciousness. Until such a time, its popular "repute" will rest with Dr. Schweitzer in Lambarene and in the fact that it contains "the other Congo Republic" (Brazzaville).

Even a cursory glance at some of the characteristics of AEF (the abbreviation of its French title and still a convenient overall designation) must convince the observer that its inconspicuousness on the world scene is understandable. As summarized by Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, it is an area of extreme "diversity and dispersion" of tribes, who are burdened by "poverty, illiteracy and lack of means of intercommunication . . . It possesses neither economic nor geographic unity." Regularly, "expenditure for imports have exceeded revenue realized from . . . exports" and these deficits are increasing. Transport and power are inadequate and high cost, and the internal market is small. Labor is weak "as to numbers, skills and organization"—and so forth. To describe AEF physically is to catalog its deficiencies.

Yet the world would ignore this whole area at its peril, for its social and political structure embodies explosive elements. Everywhere the overhead of modern politics presses down on institutions ill-fitted to its upkeep. Tribal and regional allegiances masquerade as parties or unions. "Politicians who have acquired a truly popular following are in effect great tribal chiefs, who both by tradition and because of current circumstances almost inevitably gravitate toward one-man, one-party rule . . ." The heritage of messianic cults and syncretist movements remains a lively one—Kimbangu, Mpadi and Matswa are still expected to return by their followers. (Matswanists forced a hideous death on themselves not many months ago in Brazzaville.)

The Adloffs, long respected as analysts of French colonialism and now teaching at Stanford, have produced another comprehensive work—this one complements their earlier French West Africa. The book is really an encyclopedia rather than a study, covering the government and economics of AEF as a whole under French administration and then delving briefly into similar matters in the individual territories. No one will read it straight through—partly be-

cause the style, though serviceable, rarely inspires—but everybody even remotely interested in Africa must dip into its riches.

Smoke in the Hills, Political Tension in the Morogoro District of Tanganyika, by Roland Young and Henry Fosbrooke (*Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1960*), 212 pages, \$5.50.

1900-1955, by D. Anthony Low and Buganda and British Overrule, R. Cranford Pratt (*New York: Oxford University Press, 1960*), 373 pages, \$7.70.

A measure of the success of political and economic development in Africa is the slackening of the grip of traditionalism on mass behavior. No one hopes—or wants—to destroy the indigenous culture, but neither can one deny that inevitable social changes demand a shift in loyalties, so that they can embrace elected national representatives as well as clan heads or tribal chiefs. Both the above mentioned studies throw light on the problems of effecting such a transfer or expansion of loyalties.



In one sense, both books tell of failure—in Tanganyika, failure to establish a land improvement scheme among the Luguru people; and in Buganda, failure to link "Protection" and administration to a unified government for the whole Protectorate of Uganda. (The latter "failure," of course, was ironically the result of successful relations with the sophisticated Baganda.) And in a larger sense perhaps these failures emphasize a judgment of bankruptcy on "indirect rule" as an enterprise designed to forward the progress of colonial wards and yet maintain the integrity of local institutions. The Luguru, for example, were ill-fitted from the start, for they have no single chief or set of sub-chiefs whom an administration might clothe with bureaucratic responsibility. The Baganda managed to emerge so greatly strengthened from their negotiations

in 1900 with Sir Harry Johnston (Her Majesty's Special Commissioner) that their traditional institutions and not those of a united Uganda remain the focal point of political agitation.

Professor Young (of Northwestern) and Mr. Fosbrooke (formerly Tanganyika Government Sociologist and now Director of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute) combine the skills of political science and anthropology in examining a disturbance over land reform and antecedent related difficulties in East-Central Tanganyika in 1956, in order to draw the outlines of the problem of "creating a government capable of leading the people along new paths and at the same time commanding their support."

Collapse Comes Quickly

The "facts" are rather simple. The government decided that a program of soil conservation was needed to meet the problem of erosion. But to the Luguru the program threatened traditional ways of land allocation and control. In addition, the program got mixed up in a local power struggle which contributed to the apparent conflict between the modern, alien administration and the indigenous tribal authorities. Resistance increased and demonstrations culminated in a riot, in which a man was shot by the police after refusing to heed repeated warnings. The anti-erosion scheme collapsed quickly.

The authors make a number of useful observations about the need for delicate planning before initiating administrative reforms, especially when they are tied to creating some facsimile of the processes of representative democracy. In particular, they argue that the British method—entailing the transfer of the principles of two-party competition—tends to polarize opinion between pro- and anti-government groups. Since contemporary policy entails the eventual departure of the colonial government, common sense dictates that an oppositionist attitude pays the highest dividends.

The book is concerned less with African politics than with the techniques of administration. The nationalist movement plays only a marginal role—extraordinary in a study of "political tension" today. It also appears that the authors were as much interested in analytical methods as in substantive problems; otherwise the sections on indigenous culture and rural administration would seem too detailed and clotted by jargon for the limited incident on which they bear. (Chapter one remains, however, a clear and compelling "pre-theory" of African political change.) While these attributes may preclude

The New Nigerian Elite, by Hugh B. and Mabel M. Smythe (*Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960*), 196 pp. \$5.

As the authors point out, there is, for Westerners, considerable mystery about the African succeeding the colonial official in the emerging states. In their own words, "Who are the present African elite? How do they acquire and maintain power? What are their backgrounds . . . ? How do they relate to the masses? How stable are they . . . ? How far . . . attuned to the ways of what is known as Western culture, and how far to something incompatible or even antagonistic?"

In answering this pioneer set of questions, the authors have assembled a wealth of stimulating data relating to some 156 urban Nigerians educated in Western schools (out of an "elite" estimated at between 20,000 and 40,000). However, their answers to the stated questions seem extremely uneven. This appears to be due to some unconscious "evolutionary" biases and to a certain methodological looseness. But, above all, it stems from a lack of familiarity with the source materials of Nigerian history (apart from those of the past 20 years) and with an adequate range of data relating to the traditional social structure and its dynamics. Accepting that "in view of the transitional nature of Nigeria's political status during the period of the study, . . . this analysis could not be definitive," we can but hope with the authors that "later studies . . . will be able to refine, to clarify, to fill in lacunae . . ."

—H. D. Gunn

Shooting at Sharpeville, by Ambrose Reeves (*Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961*), 142 pages, \$3.50.

The simmering South African racial cauldron erupted before the eyes of the world on March 21, 1960. On that day an intended peaceful mass demonstration organized by the Pan-African Congress wound up in a blood bath in Sharpeville Location, Transvaal, with the death of dozens of Africans and severe injuries to nearly two hundred.

The purpose of this book (*non grata* in South Africa along with its author, the former Anglican Bishop of Johannesburg) is to describe the events associated with the shooting, and in the process to relate them to previous African demonstrations in the Union, such as those of 1959 in Cato Manor (Natal) and in Windhoek Location (South-West Africa). Bishop Reeves does not equivocate on the results of his on-the-scene investigation: for him, the criminals in this tragedy are the South African police, who did not conform to their

own regulations, and behind them responsibility is placed upon the Nationalist Party's government and its ruthless enforcement of apartheid.

Although the police must shoulder the direct blame for the killing of many unarmed Africans, Bishop Reeves oversimplifies his "criminal investigation": he tells us that the obnoxious pass system and the economic poverty of the Bantu are underlying sources of malcontent behind Sharpeville and other demonstrations. He fails to state that these social evils antedate the present Nationalist government and that they are just as much a product of nineteenth century British administration. In this broader perspective, it is the whole white population in South Africa which must accept ultimate responsibility for Sharpeville.

This short book is well-written and contains vivid photographs. The brief foreword by Chief Luthuli, perhaps the most respected African political leader in South Africa, is also of interest. Whether, as Bishop Reeves contends, the shooting was an inhumane and unwarranted massacre or whether, as the government claims, it was done in self-defense, the significance of Sharpeville is greater than the physical casualties of that dark day: it points to a real tragedy in the breakdown of communications and rapport between white and black Africans, and to a new, ominous turn in race relations in that part of the disturbed African continent.

—Edward A. Tiryakian

Art in Nigeria 1960, by Ulli Beier, (*NY: Cambridge University Press, 1960*), 68 pages, section of 77 plates; cloth \$3.75, paper, \$1.95.

This is an unusually interesting consideration of Nigerian art by one of the outstanding European authorities in that country today. Beier is a frequent contributor of articles to *Odu*, a quarterly of Yoruba literature and related studies; his wife, Susanne Wenger, has been commissioned to do modern commercial art for University College, Ibadan, and elsewhere. Some of her work is used to illustrate one aspect of this field of contemporary art in Nigeria.

The book's main appeal lies in the understanding of a perceptive observer who has sufficient insight into the diminishing traditional art and developing contemporary art to relate them to the aesthetic milieu of today. His observation on the influences of Christian and European art on the African artist are original and persuasive.

The variety and technical quality of the plates are exceptional and the examples of contemporary work and commercial art are of particular interest.

—Bruce McGavren

wide readership, the student of African affairs will find much of use.

The Buganda work represents a notable achievement, the first in a series on "new forms of leadership among Africans in East Africa," sponsored by the East African Institute of Social Research. Curiously, the inaugural authors are Australian (Low) and Canadian (Pratt), an indication of the enormous magnetism of these problems. The book comprises separate studies by each author—Low on making the Uganda Agreement of 1900 and Pratt on the politics that succeeded it, with an appendix on the deportation of the Kabaka of Buganda in 1953.

The Agreement remains a fascinating document, for the Africans emerged with much more than Johnston was prepared to yield when he arrived. The Ganda chiefs got proprietary individual rights over much of the land in return for collecting taxes for the British. The net result was enhancement of the status of the chiefs, degeneration of older cultural sanctions, accumulation of capital for agricultural improvement and establishment of the position of the Lukiko as a forum of "notables"—often opposed to the Kabaka.

It was the British themselves who laid the foundations for the effective separatism that currently plagues their efforts to settle the question of Protectorate-wide political institutions. (The analysis of the deportation crisis would seem to bear this out.) The British toughened the traditional social structure of the Baganda by modifying it just sufficiently to foster prosperity and westernization. A peasant economy flourished, Christianity became the Baganda religion and entry into the ruling groups was facilitated for able and ambitious youths. Modernization occurred within and not against the tribal context.

All this goes a long way toward explaining the paradoxes of Uganda politics—where "nationalist" leaders often become ministers in the traditionalist provincial government. "Westernization" has not created a deracinated minority . . . Rather it has created a new pattern of life in which there are many Western elements but which still remains essentially a tribal one."

NOTES:

1. Road to Ghana, by Alfred Hutchinson (*NY: John Day Co., 1960*), 190 pages, \$3.50.

The Man Next To Me, An Adventure in African Medical Practice, by Anthony Barker (*NY: Harper & Bros., 1960*), 175 pages, \$3.50.

It is hard to see how the brutal atmosphere of life in South Africa cannot dehumanize virtually all its inhabitants. Those who wish proof, however, that hatred and degradation do not obliterate all kindness and good

humor should read these two books.

Mr. Hutchinson, a "Coloured" by the official racial labels of his homeland, escaped the country during a lag in the Treason Trials. He describes the sights, sounds, and smells of his journey through Rhodesia, Nyasaland, and Tanganyika on the way to the Promised Land of Ghana. The ineffable courage of the victims of white supremacy and the extensive communication among nationalist movements in southern Africa emerge clearly during the course of a dramatic narrative.

Dr. Barker and his wife run a mission hospital in a tribal reserve in Zululand. He writes a low-keyed description of his trials in dealing with ordinary country folk. The reader will be impressed that his patients exhibit many of the reactions of patients everywhere—they are "people" and not "tribesmen." For reminding us of this and for conveying an active sense of Christian strength and mercy—not yet eliminated in Africa—we are everlastingly indebted to Dr. Barker.

BOOKS RECEIVED:

1. *The South African Tradition* (NY: Information Service of South Africa, 655 Madison Ave., 1960), 28 pages, free. Survey of culture and art.

2. *The Sudan Trade and Investment Guide* (London: Diplomatic Press & Publishing Co., 1960), 84 pages, 25s. Economic reference book.

3. *Official Publications of British East Africa*, Part I, compiled by Helen Conover (Washington: Library of Congress, Card Division, 1960), 67 pages, 60¢. Bibliography of source materials.

4. *Afrique-Action*, new French-language weekly, published in Tunis. Available from Howard Publications, 1475 Broadway, NY 36. \$20 a year air mail.

5. *Curtain Up on South Africa*, Presenting a National Drama, by Garry Allighan (London: T. V. Boardman, 1960), 276 pages, 21s. A British journalist's report.

6. *Colonial Planning, A Comparative Study*, by Barbu Niculescu (Lon-

don: Allen & Unwin, 1958), 208 pages. Analysis of administration and operation of economic planning.

7. *The Land and People of South Africa*, by Alan Paton (NY: J. B. Lippincott, 1955), 139 pages, \$2.95. For American young people.

8. *Sia Lives on Kilimanjaro*, by Astrid Lindgren, photos by Anna Riwwin-Brick (NY: Macmillan, 1959), unpagged, \$2. Illustrated children's story, translated from the Swedish.

9. *Forbjudet Omrade*, by Per Wastberg (Stockholm: Wahlstrom & Widstrand, 1960), 266 pages, Kr. 23:50. Study of discrimination in Central Africa, in Swedish.

Election Report From Kenya

(Continued from page 6)

leased. Subsequently, however, a KADU spokesman denied that his party had agreed to the "joint statement."

Behind the strong stand of the KANU parliamentary group on the Kenyatta issue is not only a moral commitment to the unconditional release of Kenyatta, but also an attempt on the part of the anti-Mboya-Gichuru group within KANU's leadership to prevent their accession to governmental power. The major weapon that this group now possesses, and it is a powerful one, is to refuse cooperation until Kenyatta is released. Despite the fact that Mboya and Gichuru might want to seek other means out of the apparent impasse with the colonial government, they could hardly oppose the will of KANU's parliamentary and governing council group.

KADU, on its part, might be willing to attempt to form a government with cooperation of some European and Asian members, in the event KANU cannot do so, but this would not be a stable government. In opposition would be an embittered and perhaps a united KANU which could rapidly lead the country into a major crisis.

It would be naive to assume that a way out of this apparent impasse cannot be found, however, for both the colonial government and African leaders realize the necessity for cooperation in this new era.

Eritrea: A Colony in Transition, 1941-1952, by G. K. N. Trevaskis (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), 137 pages, 21s.

This is an important addition to the growing number of books on "Africa in political transition." The author, a former British official in Eritrea, was one of the *dramatis personae* in the saga of European and African power politics which he recounts.

Eritrea, once the cradle of Ethiopian culture and power, was the first African territory to come under Italian rule (1882). The veneer of unity and prosperity which "benevolent Italian colonialism" imposed was ripped away by World War II. Economic distress in urban and rural areas, Italophobia, and a liberal British Administration (1941-1952) led to the growth of political consciousness. These forces also resuscitated the ethnic and religious disunity of Eritrea, e.g., the Muslim-Coptic Christian attrition, and Abyssinian Shifta attacks on Tigraian

separatists. These cleavages, as well as the Ethiopian-Italian competition, intruded on the newly founded political parties. The Unionist Party, comprised primarily of Copts, sought unity with Ethiopia while the remaining parties (Muslim League, Liberal Progressive, and Pro-Italian) aimed at ultimate Eritrean independence. After several years of Big Power wrangling the UN decided (in 1950) that the territory should become "an autonomous State federated with Ethiopia." The 1950-1952 period was spent in constitution making. All this the author describes with clarity.

The author concludes that Ethiopia's temptation to place Eritrea firmly under Imperial control will always be great. Today, *de facto*, the federal autonomy of Eritrea has been compromised. Whether or not such a derogation of rights will lead to an eventual revolt, as the author suggests, is difficult to predict. In any event, there is no reason to believe that any serious inroads have been made on the profoundly divisive factors.

—A. A. Castagno

SUBSCRIBE TODAY TO THE MOST WIDELY-READ JOURNAL ON AFRICA IN THE U.S.A.

RATES for one year (11 issues including a year-end index)	
Domestic and Canada	Surface—\$1.00 Air Mail—\$3.00
Overseas (all countries) (in U. S. dollars only)	Surface—\$1.00 Air Mail—\$4.90
*Sterling Area	Surface 8/- Air Mail—35/-

*Sterling area cheques or money orders in sterling accepted.

Send a year's subscription to:

Name _____
Address _____ City _____
Zone, State, Country _____
Payment Enclosed: ☐ \$1.00 ☐ \$3.00 ☐ \$4.90 ☐ 8/- ☐ 35/-

Mail completed coupon to:
Africa Report, Suite 505 DuPont Circle Bldg., Washington 6, D. C.



Western Nigerians Recruit Americans

A four-man Nigerian recruitment mission will be in the United States from April 12 until May 5 to interview possible American candidates for various specialist positions in Nigeria's Western Region. In addition to teachers for the secondary school system, the mission is interested in expatriate experts for specific openings in the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the Ministry of Works and Transport, and the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare. Salaries offered to suitable candidates include an expatriate inducement above and beyond normal Nigerian salary scales.

Interested applicants should apply to A. A. Olaopa, the Mission Secretary, at the Embassy of Nigeria, 500 Dupont Circle Building, Washington 6, DC.

"Africa Report" is published by the African-American Institute, a private, non-profit organization incorporated under the laws of the District of Columbia and devoted to establishing closer bonds between the peoples of Africa and the United States. Other activities of the institute include scholarship programs, teacher placement in Africa, and a variety of lecture, information and visitor services.

HEADQUARTERS: 345 East 46th Street, New York 17, New York.

Washington Office: Suite 505, Dupont Circle Building, Washington 6, D. C.

Overseas Offices:

Accra: P.O. Box 2192

Leopoldville: B.P. 2920

Lagos: Private Mail Bag 2382

Dar-es-Salaam: P.O. Box 2995

Board of Trustees

President: Dr. Emory Ross, Missionary and Consultant on Africa.

Chairman: Harold K. Hochschild, Honorary Chairman of the Board of the American Metal Climax Inc.

Vice Chairman: Judge Edward R. Dudley, former United States Ambassador to Liberia.

Executive Vice President: Loyd V. Steere, former United States Minister-Consul General.

Treasurer: Lansdell K. Christie, President of the Liberia Mining Company.

Secretary: E. Ladd Thurston, Washington Attorney.

Other members of the Board: Elta Molen Barnett, Lecture recitalist; Dr. Horace Mann Bond, President Emeritus, Lincoln University; Chester Bowles, Under Secretary of State; Dr. Gray Cowan, Columbia University; Dana S. Creel, Director, Rockefeller Brothers Fund; John W. Davis, Special Director, Teacher Information and Security, Legal Defense and Educational Fund (New York); William Leo Hansberry, Professor of African History, Howard University; Alan Pifer, Executive Associate, Carnegie Corporation of New York; Zella P. Ruebhausen, President of the Board of the Women's Africa Committee.

Institute Staff

New York Office: Loyd V. Steere, Executive Vice President; Donald M. Wyatt, Executive Associate. Julian Engel, Staff Associate.

Washington Office: Gordon P. Hagberg, Director; Harry Heintzen, Deputy Director; Bruce McGavran, Business Manager; Carvin M. Jefferson, Accountant; Robert L. Sherman, Staff Associate.

Accra Office: Wilbur Jones, Acting Director.

Leopoldville Office: Donald H. Edwards, Director.

Lagos Office: J. Newton Hill, Director.

Dar-es-Salaam Office: E. Jefferson Murphy, Director.

Africa House Governing Council: William Leo Hansberry, Chairman; William Steen, Secretary; Mrs. Henrietta Van Noy, Member; William Alfred Payne, Africa House Program Officer.

Calendar

April 15: Washington, DC celebration of Africa Freedom Day, to be held at the Metropolitan Baptist Church, 1225 R Street NW, 8:30 P.M. Featured speakers: Tom Mboya, General Secretary of the Kenya African National Union; US Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas; and Kenneth Kaunda, leader of the Northern Rhodesian United National Independence Party.

April 17: New York Celebration of Africa Freedom Day, to be held at Hunter College, 8:00 P.M. Featured speakers include Tom Mboya, General Secretary of the Kenya African National Union; Kenneth Kaunda, leader of the Northern Rhodesian United National Independence Party; Hubert H. Humphrey, United States Senator from Minnesota; and Enrique de Malta Galvao, rebel captain of the Santa Maria. Entertainers include Miriam Makeba, Dizzy Gillespie, and Herbie Mann.

April-May: A series of lectures sponsored by the American Society of African

Culture and the University of Pennsylvania departments of Philosophy, International Relations, and Anthropology, to be held at the University of Pennsylvania: **April 24:** "African Tribalism," by Elliott Skinner, Igor Kopytoff, Hugh Smythe, and Mae Edley; **April 27:** "The Quality of African Political Leadership," by Channing Richardson; **May 16:** "ANC, PAC and Apartheid in South Africa," by Gwendolyn Carter. For details, write the American Society of African Culture, 15 East 40th Street, New York City.

April: An exhibition of paintings by Jean N. Luvwezo, a Congolese student at Princeton University, at the Duncan Ligoo Gallery, 215 East 82nd Street, New York City.

October 1961-July 1962: Open for bookings of the Segy Gallery's 30-piece exhibition of African Sculptures. For details, write the Segy Gallery, 708 Lexington Avenue, New York City 22.

Visitors . . .

CHARLES D. ONYEAMA, Judge of the High Court of Lagos, Nigeria, in the US until mid-April on a State Department leader grant. Programmed by the Governmental Affairs Institute.

DEREK NOEL MacLEAN BRYCESON, Tanganyika Minister for Health and Labor, in the US until early June on a State Department leader grant. Programmed by the Governmental Affairs Institute, 1726 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC.

A group of broadcasters from French-speaking Africa, in the US until early May on State Department specialist grants, includes: **JACQUES MOUDIKE**, of Garoua, Cameroun; **JEAN BITCHOKA**, of Yaounde, Cameroun; **JOSEPH FRANCOIS SEMBEY**, of Yaounde; **PIERRE MABBE**, of Yaounde; **KOUEME EDO**, of Abidjan, Ivory Coast; **SYLVAIN ZOGBO**, of Abidjan; and **CLAUDE RATASAZAKA**, of Tananarive, Malgache Republic. Programmed by the American Council on Education.

BASILE MABUSA, Minister of Education for the Province of Leopoldville, in the US until early May on a State Department leader grant. Programmed by the American Council on Education, 1785 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC.

ALEX MIVEDOR, Chief of the Water and Electricity Subdivision of the Ministry of Public Works, Republic of Togo, in the US until mid-May on a State Department leader grant. Programmed by the American Council on Education.

RAYMOND CAPO-CHICHI, student at the University of Dakar, Senegal and Administrative Secretary of the *Union Generale des Etudiants d'Afrique Occidentale*, and **TIAMIOU ADJIBADE**, student at the University of Dakar and member of the Administrative Council of UGEAO, in the US until mid-April as guests of the US National Students Association. Programmed by the International Commission of the USNSA, 3457 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

EMILE ADOLPHE DISENGOMOKO, Prefect of Discipline for the Ministry of Education in Leopoldville, in the US until early May on a State Department leader grant. Programmed by the American Council on Education.

BRUCE McKENZIE, Kenya Minister for Agriculture, **K. W. S. MacKENZIE**, Kenya Minister for Finance, and **A. WEBB**, Kenya Solicitor General, in the US until early April for discussions with the World Bank and United Nations.

OHIO STATE UNIV
LIBRARY
ACQUISITION DEPT
COLUMBUS, OH 43210

ranie
Re-
the
"Af-
Igor
Edel,
ritical
May
South
tails,
Cul-

Jean
ceton
215

book-
bition
to the
New

n the
y the

health
Pro-
venue

early
I, of
EPH
EME
UDE
mer-

ville,
mmed
NW,

f the
State
ation.

al and
Occi-
r and
April
Inter-
Penn-

nistry
tment

KEN-
al, in
United